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CASE NOTES
issue will presumably be delayed until a taxpayer seeks capital gains
treatment on the disposition of an exclusive contract right such as
that in Billy Rose. Meanwhile, the Billy Rose decision reveals a firm
intention on the part of the Second Circuit to examine the form of
transactions which give rise to taxpayers' claims for preferred income
tax treatment.
JOHN J. GOGER
Labor Law—Successor Employers—Duty to Honor Predecessor's
Collective Bargaining Agreement—NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security
Services.'—For five years (1962-67) guard services at the Lockheed
Aircraft Service Company at the Ontario International Airport in Cali-
fornia were provided by the Wackenhut Corporation. In 1967, United
Plant Guard Workers of America (UPG) won a representation election
and was certified by the NLRB as exclusive bargaining representative
of the Wackenhut employees at the Lockheed plant. Wackenhut and
the Union entered into a three-year collective bargaining contract on
April 29, 1967. Because Wackenhut's service contract with Lockheed
was due to expire on June 30, Lockheed called for bids from various
suppliers of guard services; the contract was awarded to Burns Interna-
tional Security Services, Inc. Burns, slated to take over on July 1, had
learned at a pre-bid conference on May 15 of the Union's certification
and subsequent contract with Wackenhut.
Burns retained twenty-seven of the Wackenhut guards and added
fifteen Burns guards, brought in from other locations. Burns informed
the former Wackenhut employees that they would have to join the
American Federation of Guards (AFG), a union with which Burns had
contracts at other locations, inasmuch as Burns "could not live with"
the Wackenhut cOntract. 2 On June 29, Burns recognized the AFG as
bargaining representative of the plant guards at the Lockheed unit. On
July 12, UPG demanded that Burns not only recognize it as bargaining
representative, but also honor the terms of the existing contract with
Wackenhut. These demands were refused, whereupon UPG filed unfair
labor practice charges .5
The NLRB found a violation of Sections 8(a) (1) and (2) 4 of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) in Burns' recognition
and assistance of the AFG, and a violation of Sections 8(a) (1) and
(5) 5 in Burns' failure to recognize and bargain with UPG and refusal
1 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
2 Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1),(2) (1970).
5 Section 8(a)(5) provides that
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— , . .
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
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to honor the contract entered into between UPG and Wackenhut. 6
Consequently, the Board ordered Burns to recognize UPG, honor that
union's contract with Wackenhut, and make whole the employees for
any losses suffered. In so doing, the Board adopted the view of the col-
lective bargaining agreement taken in the 1964 Supreme Court case of
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston:r that it is a unique kind of con-
tract, requiring other than conventional contract treatment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit en-
forced the Board's orders regarding unfair recognition and assistance of
a rival union and refusal to bargain, but held that the Board was without
power to order Burns to honor a contract to which it had not been a
party!'
On certiorari, affirming the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court
HELD: that a successor employer, although required to bargain with
the representative of its predecessor's employees, is not required to
honor the terms of the predecessor's contract with the union.' In so
holding, it will be submitted, the Court manifested an intention to ex-
tend one goal of the national labor policy—freedom of contract as ef-
fectuated in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB"—at the expense of the na-
tional policy of fostering industrial peace through providing stability
for collective bargaining agreements as effectuated in John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston. 11
This casenote will examine the Wiley case as the basis for the
Board's Burns decision, and the Court's reason for choosing not to rely
upon the policy of maintaining the integrity of the collective bargaining
contract effectuated in Wiley. It will then consider the Court's reliance,
in Burns, on the competing policy of freedom of contract as given effect.
in the Porter case, and will examine the two policies and Section 8(d) of
the NLRA in order to argue that the Burns Court made a pure policy
decision, grounded neither in a clearly ruling case nor in a clear legisla-
tive mandate. It will go on to note the Court's consideration of a policy
emerging from neither Wiley nor Porter—that of greater latitude for
the employer through freedom of contract—as the policy most con-
ducive to industrial peace. Finally, it will discuss recent Board and
court cases dealing with the issue of contract survival and the ways in
which, in light of these cases, the Court's Burns decision may be re-
garded. It will be submitted that, in relying on Porter when the fact
situations of the two cases are quite disparate, while at the same time
attenuating its holding to a set of facts which deviates from the usual
1:1 William J. Burns Intl Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 349, 74 L.R.R.M.
1098, 1099 (1970).
7 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
8 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911, 916 (2d
Cir. 1971).
9 . 406 U.S. at 291.
11 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
11 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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successorship pattern,12 the Court's new Burns decision, albeit the
proper decision as regards the Burns case, may be too easily distinguish-
able from future successorship cases to have the effect of answering
decisively the question of whether or not a successor employer will be
bound by a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.
The NLRB, in holding Burns bound by its predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement, relied heavily on Wiley. The Wiley case has gen-
erated a number of different interpretations, each of which, with its own
particular emphases, extrapolations and inferences, is arguably a "cor-
rect" interpretation in the eyes of its proponents, or a "blatant mis-
reading" as seen by its adversaries. This casenote adheres to the view—
hotly debated and very much at the center of the entire contract survival
controversy—that Wiley gave rise to the inference that a successor
might be ordered to honor the terms of his predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement, and that the case thus lends itself to citation in
defense of the policy of maintaining the integrity of the collective
bargaining agreement. This view of Wiley will be maintained through-
out the paper, but never without full awareness of the fact that it is
but one reading of the case.
Wiley was a section 301 12 suit to compel arbitration, brought by a
union against a successor employer which took over a company by a
merger four months before the union's collective bargaining agreement
was due to expire. The Supreme Court held in Wiley that the arbitration
clause of the collective bargaining agreement between the predecessor
employer and the union was binding upon the successor employer
despite both the expiration of the contract and the disappearance of the
predecessor through merger. In reaching its holding, the Wiley Court
admitted that under traditional notions of contract law, an unconsenting
successor would not be bound by his predecessor's contract; however,
it observed that
a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract.
it . . . [I] t is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases
which the draftsman cannot wholly anticipate. . . . The collec-
tive agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It
22 The Burns Court noted that:
Here there was no merger, sale of assets, and there were no dealings whatsoever
between Wackenhut and Burns. On the contrary, they were competitors for the
same work . . . . Burns purchased nothing from Wackenhut and became liable
for none of its financial obligations. Burns merely hired enough of Wackenhut's
employees to require it to bargain with the union as commanded by 8(a) (5)
and 9(a). But this consideration is a wholly insufficient basis for implying
either in fact or in law that Burns had agreed or must be held to have agreed
to honor Wackenhut's collective bargaining contract.
406 U.S. at 286. The dissent would go further and find this situation so unconventional
as to render Burns not a successor to Wackenhut at all. Id. at 307 (dissenting opinion).
23 Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley
Act) grants the federal courts jurisdiction to hear suits for violation of collective bargain-
ing contracts. 29 U.S.C. 11 185(a) (1970).
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calls into being a new common law—the common law of a par-
ticular industry or of a particular plant.""
Viewing Wiley as dispositive of the Burns case, the Board in Burtis
emphasized not so much the Wiley holding as what it deemed the "spirit"
of Wiley: the revolutionary notion that the time-honored concept of
privity of contract might be put aside in order to better achieve the goal
of industrial peace so central to the national labor policy."
The Board stated that the integrity of existing collective bargain-
ing agreements is necessary to the stabilization of labor relations and to
the prevention of strikes and industrial strife. It further observed that
this had been recognized by Congress in 1947 when it enacted Section
8(d) of the Act, whose proviso defines the duty to bargain as including
the duty not to terminate or modify an existing collective bargaining
agreement. The Board concluded: "Section 8(d) thus clearly demon-
strates Congress' recognition of the paramount role in maintaining in-
dustrial peace played by parties' adherence to existing collective-bar-
gaining agreements."'
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Board's application of Wiley
to the Burns facts. The Court in Burns distinguished Wiley on the basis
that it arose in the context of a section 301 suit to compel arbitration,
while Burns was an unfair labor practice action. Further, the Court
rejected the Board's application of the "spirit of Wiley" to the Burns
fact situation:
Wiley's limited accommodation between the legislative en-
dorsement of freedom of contract and the judicial preference
for peaceful arbitral settlement of labor disputes does not war-
rant the Board's holding that the employer commits an unfair
labor practice unless he honors the substantive terms of the
preexisting contract. The present case does not involve a § 301
suit; nor does it involve the duty to arbitrate. Rather, the claim
is that Burns must be held bound by the contract executed by
Wackenhut, whether Burns has agreed to it or not and even
though Burns made it perfectly clear that it had no intention
of assuming that contract. Wiley suggests no such open-ended
obligation i7
The Burns Court, then, apparently saw Wiley as applicable only in the
context of a suit to compel arbitration and attributed that case's hold-
ing to the judicially expressed preference for arbitration as a method of
settling disputes. 18
14 376 U.S. at 550 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960)).
1° 182 N.L.R.B. at 349, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1100.
10 Id. at 350, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1101.
17 406 U.S. at 286.
28 The "spirit of Wiley" interpretation favored by the Board has not been un-
acknowledged. "Although the successor was not charged with being guilty of an unfair
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• Having found inapplicable Wiley and its emphasis on industrial
peace through insuring the integrity of collective bargaining agreements,
the Court saw as decisive of the question posed in Burns—that of the
extent of a successor's responsibility to honor his predecessor's union
contract—the concept of freedom of contract as expressly mandated in
Section 8(d) of the Act and as effectuated in H.K. Porter & Co. v.
NLRB." Section 8(d) provides that the obligation to bargain "does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of
labor practice, the Wiley decision is nonetheless on point insofar as our problem of
successor employers under the NLRA is concerned." Stern, Binding the Successor
Employer to Its Predecessor's Collective Agreement Under the NLRA, 45 Temp. L.Q.
I, 6 (1971). See also Comment, 21 Syr. L. Rev. 875, 881 (1970): "By relying on policy
rather than legal principle for its rationale, the Court [in Wiley] provided the basis for
binding the successor in a corporate sale as well as in a merger .... Every court decision
since Wiley has used this policy-based rationale to compel arbitration of a successor
who obtained corporate assets through purchase rather than merger." Nor has the
interpretation lacked support. See United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers,
384 F.2d 38, 42 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968); Wackenhut Corp.
v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1964).
The Ninth Circuit, basing its holding in Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard
Workers on Wiley, stated that:
Reading the opinion as a whole . . . we are convinced that the Supreme Court
. [decided Wiley] upon a broader view dictated by the policy of the national
labor laws .. Having in view the objectives of national labor policy reflected
in established principles of federal law, the court held the described interest of
the employees outweighs that of the employer, and must prevail.
Id. at 958. It should be noted that this case, albeit involving the Wackenhut Corporation,
is not related to the Burns litigation.
One author, contending that "it was the Supreme Court [in Wiley] which not only
paved the road for the Board's Burns decision, but escorted the Board most of the
way down it," stated that "even more important than the precise holding of Wiley is
the principle for which it stands .. ." Doppeit, Successor Companies: The NLRB Limits
the Options—and Raises Some Problems, 20 DePaul L. Rev. 176, 184 (1971). The
restriction of Wiley to its narrow holding, on the other hand, is hardly unprecedented.
The Court in Wiley itself emphasized repeatedly the importance of arbitration. 376
U.S. at 549-51. The Third Circuit, in United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc.,
335 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 1964) referred to "the guarded language of the Wiley
opinion," in contending that the Supreme Court consciously restricted its holding to
the question of arbitration, and declined to venture into the area of total contract
survival. A number of writers adhered to the narrow view of Wiley. "The Court in
Wiley seemed deliberate in confining its ruling to the narrow inquiry of whether a
duty to arbitrate which had been established previously under a predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement would survive a change in ownership." Note, 73 W. Va. L. Rev.
53, 54 (1970-71). "Wiley and Overnite seem to provide the employees with sufficient
protection against abrupt changes upon transfer . . . . Neither legal analysis nor policy
balancing seem to justify a rule requiring the successor to maintain its predecessor's
entire labor contract." Comment, 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 215, 223 (1967); See also
Sangerman, The Labor Obligations of the Successor to a Unionized Business, 19 LAIL,
L.J. 160 (1968). Appalled at what he perceived as a flagrant misreading in Wackenhut
of the "quite limited" holding in Wiley, one commentator wrote: "The sole redeeming
aspect of the decision is that the court was possibly engaging in dictum with respect
to the binding nature of the entire contract, since the union bad sued only to compel
arbitration." Comment, 21 Syr. L. Rev. 875, 882, 883-84 (1970).
19 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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a concession: 12° In Porter an employer—not a successor employer—re-
fused to bargain with the union concerning a dues check-off provision
in a proposed collective bargaining agreement. The Board ordered the
employer to grant the check-off provision. 2' Despite the employer's pa-
tent bad faith, the Court held that the Board had erred in so ordering.22
The Court's rationale for its decision in Porter was rooted largely in the
history of the Act, 2° which the Court interpreted to show that its pur-
pose never was to allow substantive terms of an employer-union con-
tract to be dictated by the Board. The opinion concluded by noting that
"it is the job of Congress, not the Board or the courts, to decide when
and if it is necessary to allow governmental review of proposals for col-
lective-bargaining agreements and compulsory submission to one side's
demands. The present Act does not envision such a process!"24 The
Burns Court, then, applied the Porter interpretation of section 8 (d)—
and that section's underlying policy of freedom of contract—to the suc-
cessor employer situation. The Court gave recognition to the Board's
policy rationale for its decision, but held that policy to be outweighed
by the express legislative prohibition of section 8(d). The Court ob-
served that " [p]reventing industrial strife is an important aim of fed-
eral labor legislation, but Congress has not chosen to make the bargain-
ing freedom of employers and unions totally subordinate to this goal!'"
In applying the Porter holding to Burns, the Court made little men-
tion of the factual differences between those two cases. It is submitted,
however, that Porter is no less distinguishable from the facts of Burns
than is Wiley. As the Burns Court observed, Wiley was a section 301
action to compel arbitration, while Burns was an unfair labor practice
action. While it is true that Porter and Burns bear that similarity which
Wiley and Burns lack—they were both unfair labor practice actions—
there is a crucial difference: Porter did not involve a successor em-
ployer. Rather, it concerned the more typical refusal-to-bargain situa-
tion in which the employer simply refuses to deal in good faith with the
representative of his employees. In Porter, the contract had not yet
been agreed to. In Burns, the collective bargaining agreement at issue
was not in the proposal stage, but had already been agreed to by Wack-
enhut and UPG. It is submitted that there is a significant difference be-
tween the Board's enforcement in Burns of a substantive term originally
agreed upon by the predecessor employer and a union and, as in Porter,
the original determination of terms by the Board and the Board's sub-
sequent enforcement of such terms. In the former situation, a successor
is ordered to assume the terms of an agreement at which its predecessor
and the union arrived through good-faith bargaining, while in the latter
situation the employer and union have neither negotiated nor agreed.
20 29 U.S.C. 1 158(d) (1970).
21 H.K. Porter Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 68 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1968).
22 397 U.S. at 102, 107.
23 Id. at 102-08.
24 Id. at 109.
25 406 U.S. at 287,
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Since these factual distinctions do not allow either Porter or Wiley
clearly to control the Court's ruling in Burns, it is submitted that the
Burns holding was dictated either by a clear statutory mandate or by
application of the NLRA through a process of weighing that statute's
competing policy considerations of freedom of contract on the one hand
and prevention of industrial strife through preservation of the collective
bargaining agreement on the other.
The Burns Court found a statutory mandate for its decision in Sec-
tion 8(d) of the Act, which provides that the obligation to bargain in
good faith "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or re-
quire the making of a concession. . . ." 26 The Court saw this language
as a clear limitation on the Board's power to order Burns to honor the
collective bargaining agreement made by its predecessor and the UPG.
It is submitted, however, that it is by no means clear that section 8(d)
was meant to apply to the successor employer situation in which a collec-
tive bargaining agreement between the predecessor and the union is in
existence. In the first place, it is obvious from a reading of section 8(d)
that it contains no reference to successor employers. Since the legislative
history of this section sheds no light on Congress' intent regarding the
successor employer, and also in view of the fact that the legislation was
passed in 1947, before the burgeoning of franchises, conglomerates and
corporate takeovers made successorship a vital problem, there is a great
likelihood that successorship simply was not considered by the authors
of section 8(d).
It is further submitted that the opinions in Wiley and Porter give
rise to the inference that in those cases the Supreme Court saw no rela-
tionship between section 8(d) and successorship cases. In Wiley, the
Supreme Court reached its holding without reference to section 8(d)
or the policy of freedom of contract embodied .therein. The succes-
sor in Wiley was ordered to honor at least one term—the arbitration
clause—of its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. Indeed,
it is arguable that the result of the Wiley holding could have been, in
effect, an indirect order to honor the substantive terms of the contract. 27
Unless the Supreme Court in Wiley is to be seen as having wholly ig-
nored a specific mandate of the national labor policy, embodied in
Section 8(d) and the legislative history of the Act, the inference to
be drawn from the Court's failure to deal with Section 8(d), it is sub-
mitted, is that it felt that 8(d) had no bearing on successorship cases.
Porter, read with the awareness that Wiley preceded it, also sup-
ports the inference that the Supreme Court saw no clear relationship be-
26 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
27 The Wiley Court stated that: "This Union does not assert that it has any bar-
gaining rights independent of the . . . [predecessor's] agreement; it seeks to arbitrate
claims based on that agreement, now expired, not to negotiate a new agreement." 376
U.S. at 551 (emphasis added). It is apparent from this statement that the arbitrator's
frame of reference in resolving disputes was intended by the Court to be the contract
between the predecessor and the union. It follows that the arbitrator had the power to
compel the successor employer to honor the substantive terms of that contract.
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tween section 8(d) and successorship cases. This is so because the
Porter opinion, relying wholly on section 8(d), fails to mention Wiley
or the cases that followed it. If it is considered that successorship is a
unique phenomenon, not to be equated with an original employer-union
situation for 8(d) purposes, this omission is wholly logical; there is no
reason that the Porter Court should take into account a line of cases that
fall into a category requiring different treatment from that required by
the Porter fact situation. However, it is submitted that had the Porter
Court felt that successorship cases required similar treatment, it should
have felt compelled to deal—at least for purposes of distinguishing—
with the Wiley line of cases. Porter held that an employer cannot be
compelled to agree to a term of a collective bargaining agreement. Wiley
ordered the successor employer to honor a contractual term to which it
had not agreed. Had the Porter Court seen no basis for different treat-
ment in the fact that the latter case dealt with a successor, it should
have felt compelled to deal with the Wiley precedent in justifying its
Porter holding.
In light of the lack of legislative language clearly applying section
8(d) to successorship cases, and the failure of the Supreme Court to
recognize such applicability in Wiley and Porter, it is submitted that no
clear legislative mandate for the Burns holding exists. In view of the
fact that no such mandate is evident, this case note takes the position
that an elucidation of the underlying policy considerations of the NLRA
is necessary to justify why the Burns Court held as it did.
One of the main purposes of the National Labor Relations Act
was clearly to put an end to, or at very least ameliorate, rampant strife in
labor relations which was adversely affecting interstate commerce." The
`collective bargaining process, under which the employer would have to
-face his employees' chosen representative and attempt to come to terms
acceptable to both, was settled upon—and, so experience proved, with
great justification"—as the central means through which such industrial
peace might best be furthered." The hoped-for end of the collective bar-
gaining process would be the collective bargaining contract, mandatorily
28 See, e.g., Congressman Truax's statement on the floor of the House:
To those unfamiliar with the strife that has been engendered by . . unfair
labor practices . • . it might be well to recall that the dire need for this bill,
ever-growing industrial unrest, is caused first by the denial of the right of
employees to organize and by the refusal of employers to accept the procedure
of collective bargaining . . . .
79 Cong. Rec. 9715 (1935). Dissenting in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S.
270, 297 (1956), Justice Frankfurter noted:- • •
[T]he important considerations in promoting peaceful industrial relations
which might well have determined the action of Congress [in formulating the
Act.] In the first place, the Congress may have set a very high value on peaceful -
adjustments, i.e., the absence of strikes. One may take judicial notice of the
fact that this consideration was at the very forefront of the thinking and feeling
of the Eightieth Congress.




observed once signed, but composed of terms voluntarily arrived at. No
sooner did this contract become part of the Act's goal than it appeared
that the Act's authors had unwittingly imported a conflict into their
legislation. The policy of freedom of contract was not a stated end of the
NLRA; it was more than that, an overarching principle of common law,
a given, long settled beyond questioning. This policy and the Act's cen-
tral policy of curbing industrial strife through maintaining the integrity
of the collective bargaining process which would find its ultimate em-
bodiment in a new kind of contract were bound to clash—and so they
have. Congress' effort to adjust the conflict by making it clear in the
1947 amendment, section 8(d), that the Act was not intended to con-
travene freedom of contract transferred the Act from the proverbial
frying pan to fire, for thereafter the Act could be interpreted—perhaps
must be interpreted—as embodying two often irreconcilable policies:
freedom of contract and the achievement of industrial peace through
stabilization of collective bargaining agreements.
It appears that section 8(d) itself—at least insofar as it applies
to successorship cases—is the repository of the two conflicting policies.
On one hand it expressly states that the obligation to bargain "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession. • -..." 31 Within the same paragraph, however, it provides,
with certain stated exceptions, that, "where there is in effect a collective-
bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting com-
merce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to
such contract shall terminate or modify such contract . . . .' 182 The first
of these phrases is clearly an embodiment of the policy of freedom of
contract; the latter embodies the policy of maintaining stability
through insuring the , preservation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. While the freedom of contract policy is grounded in the common
law tradition, the latter policy is derived from the conviction that once
the collective bargaining agreement becomes viable it serves effectively
to prevent strife and thereby to encourage industrial stability. Institu-
tion of unilateral changes during the effective term of a collecitve
bargaining contract has been made an unfair labor practice under sec-
tion 8 (a) (5)."
It is possible to trace the history of the National Labor Relations
Act so as to show .that the Act was conceived as an embodiment of
freedom of contract,'34 clearly understood by Congress 85 and the Su-
at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
82 Id .
as Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 147. N.L.R,B. 788, 56 L.R.R.M..1266 (1964).
84 "The object of this Act was not to allow governmental regulation of the terms
and conditions of employment, but rather to ensure that employers and their employees
could work together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions." H.K. Porter Co. v.
NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970).
83 ' The Porter Court 'evaluated the legislative intention as follows: "This funda-
mental limitation was made abundantly clear in the legislative reports accompanying
the 1935 Act. The Senate Committee on Education and Labor stated:
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preme Court" to be so, and later amended in such a way as to guard
against possible erosion of that freedom.'
In Porter, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that free-
dom of contract is a "fundamental" policy of the Act." The policy
of freedom of contract relied upon by the Porter Court is evidenced both
in the legislative history of the labor laws and their judicial interpreta-
tion. In congressional debate concerning the Act, the Act was inter-
preted as follows:
. . . [T]his bill, which is evidently very Much misunderstood
. . . seeks to make effective the right of employees to organize
and engage in collective bargaining .... It does not require an
employer to sign any contract, to make any agreement, to
reach any understanding with any employee or group of em-
ployees. The board created in the bill is not empowered to set-
tle labor disputes; nothing in the bill allows the Federal Gov-
ernment or any agency to fix wages, regulate rates of pay, limit
hours of work, or to effect or govern any working conditions in
any establishment. . . This bill is designed to put into force
and effect the principle of collective bargaining.'
The committee wishes to dispel any possible false impression that this bill is
designed to compel the making of agreements or to permit governmental
supervision of their terms. It must be stressed that the duty to bargain
collectively does not carry with it the duty to reach an agreement, because the
essence of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to decide
whether proposals made to it are satisfactory.
[S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935)]. The discussions on the floor of
Congress consistently reflected this same understanding." Id. at 104 (footnote omitted).
38 "In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), this Court • . .
held that Congress was within the limits of its constitutional powers in passing the Act.
In the course of that decision the Court said:
"The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does
not compel any agreement whatever . . . . The theory of the Act is that free
opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is
likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and
agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel."
397 U.S. at 105 (citation omitted).
-37 Id. at 105-06, discussing the Taft-Hartley Amendments.
38 Id. at 107-08.
89 79 Cong. Rec. 9711 (1935) (Remarks of Congressman Welch). See also Senator
Walsh's interpretation of the Act:
Let me emphasize again: when the employees have chosen their organization,
when they have selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to
escort them to the door of their employer and say, 'Here they are, the legal
representatives of your employees.' What happens behind those doors is not
inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it. It anticipates that
the employer will deal reasonably with the employees, that he will be patient,
but he is obliged to sign no agreement.
Id. at 7660. The point was also stressed by Congressman Griswold, who stated:
The whole object of the bill, the only object, and the object we should not lose
sight of is that in this concentrated business of collective bargaining on the
part of business we should also have collective bargaining on the part of the
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In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.," the constitutionality
of the Act's requirement that an employer be compelled to bargain with
his employees' union was challenged, and the Act was held to be con-
stitutional. The Supreme Court, referring to the underlying purpose of
the Act, stated:
The Act does not compel agreements between employers and
employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever . . . .
The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation
with accredited representatives of employees is likely to
promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjust-
ments and agreements which the Act itself does not attempt
to compel.'
When the Act was amended in 1947, a House committee report
noted that "the present Board has gone very far, in the guise of de-
termining whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, in
setting itself up as the judge of what concessions an employer must
make and of the proposals and counterproposals that he may or may not
make" and expressed concern lest, without guidelines provided by Con-
gress, the Board "carry this process 'still further and seek to control
more and more the terms of collective-bargaining agreements. 742 This
report, in itself a reaffirmation of the legislative intent that the Act
provide only the framework for collective bargaining and in no way
allow the substantive terms of an employee-employer contact to be
dictated, led to the inclusion in Section 8(d) of language which
definitively set out that the employer and the'union representative must
meet
. and confer in good faith with'respect to wages, hours, and
other terms or conditions of employment, or the negotiation of
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the
execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession . . .
As much as the Act embodies the policy of freedom of contract,
however, so does it embody that of 'preservation of industrial peace
through maintaining the integrity of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Act grew out of Congress' conviction that interstate commerce
was being adversely affected by strife in labor relations ; 44 the collective
employee . . . This bill does not adjust labor disputes; it puts bath sides in a
position where they can adjust them.
Id. at 9682.
40 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
41 Id. at 45.
42 H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sesi. 19-20 (1947).
48 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1910).
44 See note 28 supra.
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bargaining machinery was set up as a means by which employers and
employees could discuss and hopefully agree upon a solution to their
differences. Industrial peace was a goal of the Act; collective bargain-
ing, the chosen means by which this goal was to be achieved." Section
1 of the Act includes language which sets forth the centrality of the
collective bargaining process:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to
the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protect-
ing the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and condi-
tions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection."
And in his dissent in United Mine Workers v. Pennington,'" a case
dealing with the application to labor of the antitrust laws, Justice Gold-
berg alluded a number of times to the legislature's intent that industrial.
peace through collective bargaining be established in the Act as a goal
of the national labor policy: "The history of labor relations in this
country shows, as Congress has recognized, that progress and stability
for both employers and employees can be achieved only through col-
lective bargaining agreements involving mutual rights and responsi-
bilities."48
Further support of this view is evidenced by the protection of the
sanctity of the collective bargaining contract through the unfair labor
practice machinery of the Act. The institution of unilateral changes
during the term of a collective bargaining contract is a violation of sec-
tion 8(a) (5), with the usual range of remedies available to the injured
employee or employer." In a notable 8(a) (5) case, Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. NLRB," the Supreme Court held that the employer's
contracting out, when consisting of replacement of employees in an
existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do
identical work under like conditions of employment, was a statutory
subject of collective bargaining under section 8(d) and that unilateral
contracting out of this sort was an unfair labor practice under section
8(a) (5).51 It is reasonable to infer that by so deciding the Court recog-
' 45 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
4° 29 U.S.C.	 151 (1970).
47 381 U.S. 657 (1965).	 •
49 Id. at 722 (dissenting opinion). Justice Goldberg also stated tliat: "The National
Labor Relations Act also declares it to be the policy of the United States to promote
the establishment of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment by
free collective bargaining between employers and unions." Id. at 711 (dissenting opinion).
49 The remedies available are set forth in 29 U.S.C. g 160(c) (1970).
80 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
51 Id. at 215.
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nized, at least by implication, the importance of maintaining the in-.
tegrity of the collective bargaining contract. The contract is the em-
bodiment of an agreement at which the employer and the representative
of the employees have arrived. A unilateral change by either party is
tantamount to a statement that the contract is only to be abided by
when it is convenient to abide by it—in other words, that it is altogether.
meaningless, or at least potentially so. To allow the contract, which is
the hoped-for culmination of the whole• collective bargaining process,
to be thus rendered nugatory, would make a mockery of collective bar-
gaining. Protection against such an eventuality, which is offered by
making unilateral changes during the term of a collective bargaining
agreement into a section 8(a) (5) unfair labor practice, demonstrates
the Court's recognition that just as collective bargaining is central to the
purpose of the Act, 52 so is maintenance of the collective bargaining
agreement crucial to the meaningful operation of the process as a whole.'
The Board's position as summarized by the Supreme Court in
H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB," was that the collective bargaining contract
had a seminal position in the Act's general plan of reducing industrial
strife:
[T] he history of the collective bargaining process . . . [demon.:
strates] that its objective has long been an agreement between
employer and employees as to wages, hours and working condi-
tions evidenced by a signed contract or statement in writing,
which serves both as recognition of the union with which the
agreement has been reached and as a permanent memorial
of its terms .... [T]he signed agreement has been regarded as
the effective instrument of stabilizing labor relations and pre-
venting, through collective bargaining, strikes and industrial
strife."
It can be inferred, then, that Congress saw stability of collective
bargaining agreements as essential to attainment of the goal of industrial
peace. And it is clear that the importance of collective bargaining, along
with freedom of contract, was central to the Act.
It has been submitted that no clear legislative mandate for the
Court's Burns decision exists and that both Porter and Wiley -are dis-
tinguishable from Burns on their facts. On those grounds it would seem
that the only adequate justification for the decision is that the Court
determined that the policy of freedom of contract outweighs the policy
of preserving industrial peace through maintaining the integrity of the
collective bargaining agreement: "Preventing industrial strife is an irn- ,
portant aim of federal labor legislation, but Congress has not chOsen to
make the bargaining freedom of employers and unions totally subordi-•
62 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937). •
68 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
54 Id. at 523-24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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nate to this goal."55 Influencing this decision on the Court's part was
another policy issue, in this instance arising not out of the Act, but out
of the realities of the business community: that of possible unfairness to
the employer inherent in a successor's being made to assume his
predecessor's collective bargaining contract, and the resultant negative
effect upon industrial peace: "We also agree with the Court of Appeals
that holding either the union or the new employer bound to the substan-
tive terms of an old collective bargaining contract may result in in-
equities." 58
The majority found the potential for unfairness to both sides in-
herent in the fact that a successor employer, regardless of how con-
vincingly it be argued that he "stands in the shoes"" of his predecessor
vis-à-vis collective bargaining with the union, is nevertheless not that
predecessor, but a new and unique employer with new and unique char-
acteristics:
A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund
business only if he can make changes in corporate structures,
composition of the labor force, work location, task assignment,
and nature of supervision . . . On the other hand, a union may
have made concessions to a small or failing employer that it
would be unwilling to make to a large or economically success-
ful firm.58
A rule requiring a successor to honor the substantive terms of his
predecessor's bargaining contract, therefore, might well be self-defeating
in that the crippling restraints placed upon employer and union alike
will serve to retard industrial peace more surely than the stability in-
herent in contract survival will tend to promote it." Nor will the ripples
created stop with the employer and the union: to any extent to which
takeover and subsequent bolstering of failing companies is discouraged,
company stockholders and eventually the general public also join the
roster of those negatively affected." The truth of this contention is dif-
ficult to dispute. The attempt can be made, however—and in reaction
to the Second Circuit's decision in Burns, has been made—to outweigh
it with another truth: the overwhelming imbalance of security in favor
55 406 U.S. at 287.
50 Id.
57 William J. Burns Intl Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 350, 74 L.R.R.M.
1098, 1101 (1970).
58 406 U.S. at 287-88.
5D "A requirement of concession on [substantive terms] will dampen the desire to
trade and thus chill the bargaining process. Therefore, while employer concession as to
some minor issues may be necessary to demonstrate good faith, total concession is not
only unnecessary, but also undesirable." Comment, 1968-1969 Annual Survey of Labor
Relations Law, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 785, 852 (1969).
00 Comment, 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., supra note 18, at 223.
Doppelt, supra note 18, at 185; Comment, 25 Okla. L. Rev. 132, 138 (1972).
But see Comment, 21 Syr. L. Rev., supra note 18, at 894.
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of the employer if the union cannot depend upon a collective bargain-
ing agreement to survive a change of employers."
Had Wackenhut remained the employer and hired several new
guards, these guards would have been bound by the terms of the
Wackenhut-UPG contract.' Why, then, should the former Wackenhut
guards who went to work for Burns when Burns took over—employees
whose very action in remaining to work for the successor evinces their
conception of themselves neither as "Wackenhut employees" nor as
"Burns employees," but as "security guards at Lockheed"—have to
settle for any lesser degree of security? 04 The knowledge that the agree-
ment in which their basic security resides" is tantamount to an agree-
ment between them and a particular employer, rather than to an
agreement between them and an ongoing employing entity—and the
subsequent knowledge that the agreement's continued existence is to be
governed by an individual's decisions rather than by the comparatively
stable fortune of an employing industry—could foster in the workers a
sense of insecurity which might well militate against labor-management
harmony. What ought to be a shield for employees could therefore
turn into a Sword of Damocles.
The prospective impact of the Supreme Court's Burns decision is
unclear. That the emphasis in deciding Burns might have fallen upon the
preservation of industrial peace rather than the preservation of freedom
of contract is attested to not only by the Board's Burns decision, in
which the former policy was given ruling effect," but also by the reac-
tion of a number of legal scholars after the Court of Appeals' reversal
of the Board." The furthering of either policy may, in many situations,
automatically imply a relative flouting of the other. In any such event,
the weighing and balancing of interests that must take place in order
to decide which of the goals to effectuate—and, concomitantly, which to
temporarily relegate to a lesser importance—requires that the precise
412 182 N.L.R.B. at 350, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1101.
6a Cf. Statement of M. Gottesman to N.Y.U. 18th Annual Conference on Labor,
April 1965, reported at 58 L.R.R.M. 43, 44 (1965).
64 Id.
66 182 N.L.R.B. at 350, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1101.
00 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 74 L.R.R.M.
1098 (1970).
07 See, e.g., Comment, 25 Okla. L. Rev. 132, supra note 61, where the author
concludes that "[Ole lack of any significant interference with the substantive results of
private collective bargaining coupled with the strong national labor policy in favor of
industrial peace in labor relations . . . argue for the validity of the Board's decision in
Burns." Id. at 136.
Sec also Doppelt, supra note 18, at 185, who argues in support of the Boird's Burns
decision:
The Burns rule . . . can further the basic labor policy of avoiding "industrial
strife." With Burns, all parties know where they stand from the outset of their
relationship. They are aware of their mutual rights and obligations. This ordi-
narily reduces confrontations and disputes, necessarily adding to labor stability.
But see, Patrick, Implications of the John Wiley Case for Business Transfers, Collective
Agreements, and Arbitration, 18 So. Car. L. Rev. 413, 430 (1966).
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facts at hand be carefully considered. Slight differences in facts could
easily and justifiably tip the balance one way or the.other. This is not
to say that the facts in Burns might not necessitate a decision identical
to that in Porter, but merely that, because of the difference in fact situa-
tions, the extrapolation is not an automatic one. The Court leaves its
Burns holding—at least, insofar as it is based on Porter—dangerously
vulnerable by omitting both an acknowledgement of the differences
between the two cases and an explication of any reasons they may have
for seeing such a difference as, for the - purposes of the Burns decision,
Irrelevant. This dual omission leaves room for critics of the opinion to
speculate that no such reasons exist.
Viewed in the light of recent Court and Board cases dealing with
the issue of contract survival, the Board's Burns rule was not the
epitome of heresy, but a logical and anticipated developmental step in a
'new orthodoxy. Wiley, with its break with traditional concepts of privity
of- contract through recognition of the collective bargaining agreement
as being in ,a unique class of contracts not susceptible of conventional
contract-law treatment," was not left to stand alone, a judicial aberra-
tion to be distinguished and ultimately overruled. The Ninth Circuit,
in Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers" held that a suc-
cessor employer which had purchased the assets of a limited partner-
ship and hired substantially all of the partnership's employees was
. bound by the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. The Wack-
enhut court gave Wiley a broad interpretation, viewing its rule as ap-
-plicable to a sale as well as to a merger, and further seeing it as
requiring total contract survival. The Third Circuit, in United Steel-
workers of America v. Reliance Universal, Inc.," retreated somewhat
from Wackenhut in that it limited its holding to the successor's• duty
to arbitrate; however, the possibility of full contract survival was left
an open-ended question under Reliance, which gave the collective bar-
gaining agreement a special status as "an embodiment of the law of the
shop .. . the basic charter of labor relations at the . . . plant after the
change of ownership,'"' and left to the arbitrator's discretion the
extent to which this charter should bind the successor employer. The
Fifth Circuit, in United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers of
America," held a successor bound by the substantive prdvisions of
his predecessor's collective bargaining contract despite the union's loss
of majority status and decertification. Relying upon Wiley, the Board
ruled in Overnight Transportation Co." that a successor's effecting of
Unilateral changes before bargaining with the predecessor's union con-
stituted an unfair labor practice, thus effectively if not explicitly man-
08 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964).
22 332 F.2d -954, 958 (9th Cir. 1954).
.•70 335 F.2d 891, 894 (3d Cir. 1964).
71 Id: at 895.
72 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1967).
'	 '.78 157 N.L.R.B.- 1185, 61 L.R.R.M. 1520 (1966), enforced, 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967)..
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dating survival of the substantive terms of the contract." And in Perm
Vinyl Corp.," the Board ordered a successor to remedy unfair labor
practices perpetrated by its predecessor. Seen in the light of this line of
cases, the Board's Burns decision was not a new rule, but a codification
of a practice already in existence. 7° From this point of view, the
Supreme Court's Burns decision may be seen as a step backwards, a
rejection of the most viable means. of balancing two major policies
underlying the National Labor Relations Act: freedom of contract, and
industrial peace through collective bargaining.
From another point of view, however, the Supreme Court's decision
in Burns is a return to the status quo" from a deviation—consisting of
Wiley and its progeny—which was at best ambiguous and at worst
catastrophic." From this vantage point, Wiley is seen as a heretical
decision which exposed labor relations in general to a state of upheaval
and uncertainty by making an assault against the previously unassail-
able bulwark of freedom of contract. The Board's Burns decision is con-
comitantly seen as an overt statement of a doctrine that could have been
74 "Although this case COvernite] does not stand for the proposition that under
Board law a successor employer must adopt the terms of its predecessor's contract, the
result of the decision is practically the same." Sangerman, The Labor Obligations of a
Successor to a Unionized Business, 19 Lab. L.J. 160, 175 (1968). Since the Supreme
Court's decision in Burns, a Board order similar to that in Overnite has been denied
enforcement insofar as it required the successor to refrain from making unilateral changes
in the terms of its predecessor's bargaining agreement. NLRB v. Wayne Convalescent
Center, Inc., F.2d —, 81 L.R.R.M. 2129 (6th Cir. 1972). In Wayne a successor employer,
although cognizant of an agreement between his predecessor and a union, nevertheleis
instituted new regulations concerning paid vacations, wage rates, and sick leave benefits.
The Board, deciding prior to the Burns decision, ruled that the successor violated its
duty to bargain by making unilateral changes. The Sixth Circuit, deciding after Burns
and concentrating particularly on the language in the Burns opinion discussing the
severe impediment that a requirement of total contract survival could prove to potential
successors to moribund businesses, held that the changes made were the employer's initial
terms of employment, about which no negotiation with the union was necessary. In
light of Burns, the Board, too, has adopted a position similar to that of the Sixth
Circuit, In Hecker Mach., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 1972 CCH Lab. Cases Tr 24,555,
the Board held that a successor was not obliged to uphold the substantive terms of its
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.
75 164 N.L.R.B. 968, 65 L.R.R.M. 1168 (1967), enforced sub. nom. United States
Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968).
Doppelt, Successor Companies: The N.L.R.B. Limits the Options—And Raises
Some Problems, 20 DePaul L. Rev. 176, 184 (1971); Bernstein, Labor Problems on
Acquisitions and Sale of Assets, in Proceedings of N.Y.U. Twenty-second Annual Con-
ference on Labor 103 (T.G. Christenson ed. 1970). But see Comment, 21 Syr. L. Rev.
875, 882-88 (1970) for a treatment of these cases as misinterpretations of Wiley, and not
the components of a new rule. This commentator viewed these cases as possible pre-
cursors of a dangerous new rule about to be formulated (which fear was realized in
the Board's Burns decision).
77 The majority in Burns points out that "the Board's prior decisions . . .• until
now have consistently held that, although successor employers may be bound to
recognize and bargain with the union, they are not bound by the substantive provisions
of a collective-bargaining contract negotiated by their predecessors but not agreed to
or assumed by them." 406 U.S. at 284.
75 Comment, supra note 76, at 876.
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distinguished away as a mere implication in Wiley, and as a misreading
of Wiley in such cases as followed and/or expanded upon it. Adherents
of Ibis view will welcome the new Supreme Court ruling as a boon to
employers and employees alike, at once both a laying to rest of the
ambiguities set in motion by Wiley—e.g., is a successor obliged to honor
all the substantive terms of his predecessor's union contract, or merely
those mandating arbitration?—and an evasion of the equally ambiguous
possibilities' inherent in the Board's Burns rule—for instance: to what
extent will a successor have to follow his predecessor's precise hiring and
firing standards, pension plan, and seniority determinations?
The two lines of opinion regarding total contract survival—that
which argues in favor of it with employees' security and prevention of
industrial strife in mind, and that which argues against it armed with
observations concerning the evils of shackling employers, each seeing
the greater well-being of the industrial community as hinging upon the
factors which it emphasizes—have long been recognized. 8° Out of the
first of these camps emerges the Board's Burns decision; out of the
second, the Supreme Court's. The split of opinion, both judicial and
academic, and the acknowledgement of the advantages and drawbacks
implicit in either position, bespeak a frustratingly balanced issue. It is
submitted that the new Burns decision runs the risk of being treated—
both as a result of the language employed by the Court and because of
the large number of proponents and detractors alike of both sides of the
79 Doppelt, supra note 76, at 186-90.
80 In 1967, Board Member J. H. Fanning recognized the relatively balanced merits
of the two lines of opinion that have formed around the issue of survival of the
substantive terms of a collective bargaining contract:
There is one body of responsible opinion that argues for the strict application
of the contract where it can be established that despite a change in ownership
there is a continuity of employer identity based on operational criteria and the
contract stays within the reasonable duration set by the Board. The advocates
of this position look upon the collective bargaining agreement as a kind of
quasi-public regulatory code which governs the industrial community and which
acts as a shield for employees against sudden changes in their employment
status wrought by entrepreneurial rearrangements. A kind of immutability is
attached to this code based upon the fact that the establishment of industrial
goVernment in the industrial community is not imposed for its own sake alone,
but for the broader purpose that the still greater interest of the national
community, of which the industrial community is but a part, is entitled to
protection as well.
An equally responsible body of opinion maintains that the humanitarian-
motivated solicitude for employees affected by a change of employers tends to be
too impractical and unrealistic under the highly competitive demands of today's
business world. It will be only the most unusual employer, argue the advocates
of this position, who will walk into the mare's nest that "being bound by the
contract" entails. Thus, say the proponents, if a successor is to be the rescuer
of a moribund or even uneconomical enterprise, he must not be shackled by an
impediment which may prevent him from making those changes which in his
business judgment are in the best interests of the . . . employees themselves by
improving their job security.
Address by John H. Fanning at the Annual Convention of the State Bar of Texas,
July 7, 1967, reprinted in 1967 Labor Relations Yearbook 284, 292.
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contract survival issues—as not having been decisive of the issue at all.
Burns does not overrule Wiley, but merely distinguishes it on its facts;
the Court's rejection of the "spirit" interpretation of Wiley can likewise
be viewed by the Board and courts in future decisions as being ap-
plicable only to the precise fact situation in Burns. Since Burns does
not present the usual successorship situation," it will not take very
sophisticated manipulation to distinguish this case from the fact situa-
tions in future successorship cases.
A court wishing to find a duty of a successor to continue his
predecessor's contract would merely have to find that succession to the
business had occurred through a sale of assets in order to hold that the
fact situation is sufficiently different so that the Burns rule need not be
applied, much as the Burns Court distinguished Wiley partly on the
basis of its having arisen in the context of a merger. Such court would
then be in the following quandary: on one hand, it would have Wiley,
not overruled by Burns and arguably applicable; on the other hand it
would have the Burns rule, the Supreme Court's last word—but argu-
ably confined to one discrete type of successorship case. At best, this
hypothetical court is free to choose between Wiley and Burns; at worst,
squarely facing the fact that neither Wiley nor Burns directly and
clearly applies to the sale of a business, it might choose to formulate an
altogether new rule. On the other hand, judicial bodies that so desire
will be able to find in the Burns holding a basis for refusing to bind a
successor to the substantive terms of its predecessor's labor contract,
even in a fact situation differing from that of Burns.
By specifying that "Nesolution turns to a great extent on the
precise facts involved here," 82 and yet in relying for that resolution
largely upon Porter, the facts of which are quite different from the facts
in Burns, the Court left itself open to precisely the kind of interpreta-
tion that it rejected when applied to Wiley. Future decisions, wholly
contradictory of each other, may well find equal reason for reliance
upon Burns, depending on whether they have chosen to interpret it as
applying only in cases presenting similar facts or as implying an extrap-
olation to all successorship cases.
The answer seems clear: if Burns has failed to settle the upheaval
initiated by Wiley, if neither Court nor Board seems able to formulate
an unambiguous, comprehensible rule that will have application to any
given variant of the successorship situation, the reason well may be that
81 In a usual successorship situation, a sale of the predecessor's assets, or a substantial
portion thereof, occurs. The traditional standards for successorship have been articulated
as follows: "[f]n applying the standard of substantial continuity of the business enter-
prise, the courts have tended to focus on whether: (1) the new employer has acquired
substantial assets of the employer originally under contract with the union; (2) the
new employer has continued its predecessor's business in the same or similar manner; and
(3) the new employer has hired a substantial proportion of its predecessor's employees."
Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. Rev. 735,
750-51 (1969).
82 406 U.S. at 274.
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no.such rule is capable of judicial formulation. If the Board and the
Court examine and'reexamine, interpret and reinterpret the NLRA with
results that add less to the fund of knowledge than to the morass of
confusion that surrounds the successorship question, it well may be
because they are searching for something that simply isn't there. The
Board has tried; the Supreme Court has tried. It is time for the
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A. TOTAL NO. COPIES PRINTED NO Press Run)
1885 2145
B, PAID CIRCULATION
I. BALES THROUGH (SEALERS AND CARRIERS, STREET
VENDORS AND COUNTER SALES 50 50
2. MAIL SUBSCRIPTIONS
1149 1149
C. TO AAAAA ID CIRCULATION 1149 1149
O. FREE blISTFUSUTION BY MAIL, CARRIER OR OTHER MEANS
1. SAMPLES. COMPLIMENTARY, AND OTHER FREE COPIES 34 35
2. COPIES DISTRIBUTED TO NEWS AGENTS. BUT NOT SOLD
o 0
E. TOTAL DISTRIBUTION gum ofCaridD)
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